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Abstract 
The written text is a social situation. That is to say, it has its existence in something more than the marks 
on the page, namely the participations of social beings whom we call writers and readers, and who 
constitute the writing as communication of a particular kind, as 'saying' a certain thing. Just as the 
sociologist attempts to uncover structures and regularities in social situations, so it is assumed that the 
meaning of writing is an a prion to be uncovered existing either as a function of the language, or the 
inscription of something in the mind of the writer, or the reconstruction of the reader's experience. 
Constitutive Graphonomy, the constitutive ethnography of writing systems, is concerned to examine the 
objective meanings of writing as social accomplishments of these participants. This is because meaning 
is a social fact which comes to being within the discourse of a culture, and social facts as well as social 
structures are themselves social accomplishments. 
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Constitutive Graphonomy: A Post-
Colonial Theory of Literary Writing 
The written text is a social situation. That is to say, it has its existence in 
something more than the marks on the page, namely the participations of 
social beings whom we call writers and readers, and who constitute the 
writing as communication of a particular kind, as 'saying' a certain thing. 
Just as the sociologist attempts to uncover structures and regularities in 
social situations, so it is assumed that the meaning of writing is an a prion to 
be uncovered existing either as a function of the language, or the inscription 
of something in the mind of the writer, or the reconstruction of the reader's 
experience. Constitutive Graphonomy, the constitutive ethnography of 
writing systems, is concerned to examine the objective meanings of writing 
as social accomplishments of these participants. This is because meaning is 
a social fact which comes to being within the discourse of a culture, and social 
facts as well as social structures are themselves social accomplishments. 
Constitutive Graphonomy is a post-colonial literary theory. It can be 
described as such for several reasons: it affirms the fact that a literary theory 
is a cultural formation; it resists the reification of the art form out of its social 
and cultural provenance; it confirms the text as originating in material 
practice at a dual site of production and consumption; it contributes to a 
dismantling of our nominal and largely unexamined assumptions of literary 
definition, reassessing what kinds of writing Tit' or could be considered to 
fit into the category 'literature'; it questions the assumptions of the process 
of ascribing merit through critical practice. But above all it focuses the 
meaning event within the usage of social actors who present themselves to 
each other as functions in the text, and by its privileging of cultural distance 
at the site of this usage it resolves the conflict between language, reader and 
writer over the 'ownership' of meaning. These characteristics do not 
represent an 'essential' feature of post-colonial theory, nor are they 
necessarily exclusive to it. Rather they are individual and overlapping 
features of this particular discursive formation. 
Clearly the notion of the text as dialectical accomplishment requires some 
clarification, since our assumption of the givenness of texts is supported at 
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Clearly the notion of the text as dialectical accomplishment requires some 
clarification, since our assumption of the givenness of texts is supported at 
the very least by the evidence of their physical tangibility. To the question, 
'How do you mean?', we could say that the meaning of a word is meant by the 
person who utters it and is taken to mean something by the person who hears 
it. As a radical over-simplification of the history of European literary theory 
we could say that such history has been an arena in which all of these 
participants - the language, the utterer or writer, and the hearer or reader 
- have been locked in a gladitorial contest over the ownership of meaning. 
But on closer examination it can be seen that all three 'functions' of this 
exchange participate in the 'social' situation of the written text. The constant 
insistence of that discourse which operates through hybridity and 
marginality is that writing is a social practice. There is simply no room in 
post-colonial literature for a reified art that 'exists for its own sake'. 
Admittedly, the political impetus of post-colonial theory has been to focus 
meaning at the site of production. But such theory is in a unique position to 
resolve some of the lingering questions of European theory because it exists 
in a permanent and creative tension with the metropolitan centre and its 
privileging of standard code, intrinsic value and veridical truth. 
Meaning is a social accomplishment characterised by the participation of 
the writer and reader 'functions' within the 'event' of the particular 
discourse. Meaning may thus be called a 'situated accomplishment' - a term 
which takes into account the necessary presence of these functions and the 
situation in which the meaning occurs. It is easy to see the understanding 
reached in conversation as a 'situated accomplishment', for the face-to-face 
interaction enables a virtually limitless adjustment to the flow of talk. The 
central feature of such activity is presence, the presence of the speaker and 
the hearer to each other constituting language as communication. Yet even 
in the most empathetic exchange the speaker and hearer are never fully 
present to one another. The experience of one conversant can never become 
the experience of the other: the 'mind' is a retrospective and largely 
hypothetical concomitant to what is 'revealed' in language. Meaning and 
understanding of meaning can occur because the language encodes the 
reciprocity of the experiences of each conversant. It is the situation, the 
'event' of this reciprocal happening which 'tells', which 'refers', which 
'informs'. 
The example of conversation alerts us to the extent and the limitation of 
the structuring activities of individuals in any social situation. No person is 
a totally free agent, for that would be to deny the effects of society, culture, 
and history upon the individual and the situation in which s/he is acting. But 
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rather than upcm the participating individuals. And though these individuals 
can direct or unleash the potentialities of the antecedents, affecting the 
situation, they cannot change them. The apparently simple example of a 
casual conversation clearly demonstrates the complex array of structuring 
participations in the social event. But it is the 'event', the situation of its 
structure and structuring participations rather than the contingent 
intentions or psychological sates of speakers, which imparts a direction and 
a meaning to the conversation. 
The discursive 'event', the site of the 'communication', therefore becomes 
of paramount importance in post-colonial literatures because the 
'participants' are potentially so very 'absent'. Indeed, unlike spoken 
discourse, the central problematic of studies of writing is absence. It is not so 
easy to see the written meaning as the 'situated accomplishment' of 
participants because the message 'event' occupies the apparent social fissure 
between the acts of writing and reading, the discursive space in which writer 
and reader as social actors never meet. Whether the writing is a newspaper 
article, instructions for the assembly of a model aeroplane, or a philosophical 
treatise, the writer and reader have access to each other only through the 
mutual construction of the text within certain linguistic and generic 
parameters. That distance between minds, which seems to be compensated 
for in the spoken conversation by the situation of the dialogue, would appear 
to elude writing. The written text stands apart in its own material integrity, 
apparently unrelated to persons, to language or to social systems in any 
purely mechanical or isomorphic way, but grounded in the semiotic systems 
by which such persons and systems are imputed. How meaning is 
constructed in the writing by its absentee users becomes a central question 
in writing studies and is made much more salient by post-colonial writing 
systems in which writer and reader might have ranges of experience and 
presuppositions which may not be expected to overlap greatly, if at all. The 
additional perspective which the consideration of post-colonial literatures 
brings to this discussion is obviously their accentuation of this phenomenon 
oidistance: they present us with writers and readers far more 'absent' from 
each other than they would be if located in the same culture; they present 
a situation which in some cases (because the genre of written prose is so 
removed from some cultures) provides a totally ambivalent site for 
communication. One qualification to this may be that the sharing of an 
imperial system of education and cultural patronage, issuing forth in the 
widespread uniformity of curriculae, readers, and other cultural 'guides' 
used throughout Britain's empire, considerably ameliorates this distancing 
within the post-colonial world. But even in the monoglossic settler cultures 
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used throughout Britain's empire, considerably ameliorates this distancing 
within the post-colonial world. But even in the monoglossic settler cultures 
the sub-cultural distancing which generates the evolution of variant 
language shows that the linguistic cultures encompassed by the term 
'English' are vastly heterogeneous. Most importantly, post-colonial 
literatures provide, through the métonymie function of language variance, 
a writing which actually installs distance and absence in the interstices of the 
text. 
The face-to-face situation of spoken discourse is replaced by the 
distanciation of the writing system, a distance which frees the meaning from 
the constraints of speech and creates a vehicle which at once confirms and 
bridges the absence of writers and readers. As writing, the message event is 
not merely a different physical mode, but a different ontological event. 
Derrida claims that: 
Inscription alone ... has the power to arouse speech from its slumber as sign. By 
enregistering speech, inscription has as its essential objective ... the emancipation of 
meaning ... from the natural predicament in which everything refers to the 
disposition of a contingent situation. This is why writing will never be simple 'voice 
painting' (Voltaire). It creates meaning by enregistering it, by entrusting it to an 
engraving, a groove, a relief, to a surfece whose essential characteristic is to be 
infinitely transmissible.^ 
By freeing language from the contingent situation, writing, paradoxically, 
gives language its greatest permanence, whilst, at the same time, giving 
meaning its greatest volatility, because it opens up horizons within which 
many more sets of relations then those pertaining to the contingent situation 
can be established. Writing does not merely inscribe the spoken message or 
represent the message event, it becomes the new event. Nor is it merely the 
inscription of thought without the medium of speech, for such thought is 
only accessible as a putative associate of the event. Post-colonial literature 
reveals this most clearly when its appropriation of English, far from 
inscribing either vernacular or 'standard' forms, creates a new discourse at 
their interface. Post-colonial writing represents neither speech nor local 
reality but constructs a discourse which may intimate them. This distinction 
ought to be made as clearly as possible. While writing is a new ontological 
event it does not cut itself off from the voice. The inscription of the 
vernacular modality of local speech is one of the strategies by which a 
marginal' linguistic culture appropriates the imported language to its own 
conceptions of society and place. This discourse also questions the Derridian 
conclusion that writing is infinitely transmissable and hence infinitely 
interpretable. Infinite transmissability assumes a totally homogeneous 
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subsumes all writing into a universalist paradigm which is essentially that of 
the metropolitan centre. 
The danger exists that within this universalist paradigm writing may 
become reified. In fact, this problem begins with structuralist linguistics, 
which tends to reify the linguistic code. In Saussure's distinction between 
langue and parole, langiie is the code or set of codes on the basis of which a 
speaker produces parole, a particular message.^ While langue, the description 
of the synchronic systems of language, is the object of linguistics, the parole, 
the language in use, the intentional message, focuses a study of language on 
its actual operation. 'Hoyjparole is precisely what Saussure's Course in General 
Linguistics (1916) is not about, and ever since its publication, linguistics, the 
handmaiden of structuralism, has bracketed the message in order to 
concentrate on the code, in which it is primarily interested. 
A post-colonial approach to linguistics, however, redresses this imbalance 
by focusing on the message, reinstating the parole as the realisation of the 
code in social life. This has the consequence of re-establishing the 'margins' 
of language as the substance of theory. This reassertion of the margins of 
language use over the dominance of a standard code, a centre, is the most 
exciting conclusion of the theory of the 'creóle continuum'.^ But it is also 
instrumental in conceiving the discourse of the post-colonial as rooted in 
conflict and struggle, as 'counter-discourse',^ since the perpetual 
confrontation with a 'standard code' is that which constructs the language. 
This does not mean the replacement of one canon for another, or the 
reconstruction of the centre which is being subverted. Such a re-orientation 
emphasises the fact that the code is abstracted from the activity, and 
re-installs the priority of the practical or constitutive semiology of the 
message. This observation reveals that language has its only practical 
existence in the parole within which the usage of members, rather than a 
supervenient system or a priori referentiallity, determines meanings. This 
becomes particularly true of english in which the notion of a standard 'code' 
is dismantled by the continuum of practices by which the language is 
constituted. 
This constitutive semiology radically modifies the most fundamental 
tenets of Saussurian theory, namely; 
(a) That in semiotic system there are differences but no substantial existence. No entity 
belonging to the structure of the system has a meaning of its own; the meaning of a 
word, for example, results from the opposition to the other lexical units of the same 
system. 
(b) That all systems are closed, without relation to external, non-semiotic reality.^ 
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While it is certainly true that meaning is not necessarily determined by 
the external relation of a sign and a thing, meaning is determined within 
the relations aaualised within the message rather than those purely 
abstracted in the system. In short, language is a social medium for 
individuals rather than a self sufficient system of inner relationships. Though 
it does not determine meaning ostensively, it is a social act within which 
reality is determined. Consequently, the message event marks the terrain of 
meaning for the written work, for only the message event gives currency to 
language within the relations of social beings. Neither the mental lives of 
speakers and writers nor the objects of their talk can usurp this fundamental 
concern. 
Constitutive Graphonomy reassesses traditional approaches to meaning 
such as those in speech act theory.® While we can inscribe the propositional 
content of a speech act we cannot, for instance, inscribe its illocutionary 
force. Such force is carried in the situation of the message. Both the 
illocutionary and perlocutionary force of the sign THIS WAY are embodied 
entirely in its character as sign and the social conventions surrounding its 
role. Similar conventions surround and determine the forms of different 
kinds of writing, particularly those given the designation 'literary'. The 
illocutionary force of these texts similarly cannot be conveyed by means of 
grammar, italics, and punctuation, but rather is actualised constitutively in 
the conventional practice - the situation - of the reading. The writing 'event' 
thus becomes the centre of the accomplishment of meaning, for it is here 
that the system, the social world of its users, and the absent 'participants' 
themselves, intersect. 
The post-colonial affirms the orientation of writing to the message event. 
The immense 'distance' between author and reader in the cross-cultural or 
sub-cultural text undermines the privilege of both subject and object and 
opens meaning to a relational dialectic which 'emancipates' it.^ This 
emancipation, however, is limited by the 'absence' which is inscribed in the 
cross-cultural text, the gulf of silence installed by strategies of language 
variance which signify its difference. Inscription therefore does not 'create 
meaning' by enregistering it; it initiates meaning to a horizon of relation-
ships cirsumscribed by that silence which ultimately cannot be traversed by 
an interpretation. It is this silence, the active assertion of the post-colonial 
text, rather than any culture-specific concept of meaning, which questions 
metropolitan notions of polysemity and resists the absorption of post-colonial 
literature into the universalist paradigm. We can thus see how important is 
the cross-cultural literary text in questions of meaning. Nothing better 
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describes to us the distance traversed in the social engagement which occurs 
when authors write and readers read. But it is clear that the distances are 
traversed. Writing comes into being at the intersection of the sites of 
production and consumption. Although the 'social relationship' of the two 
absent subjects is actually a function of their access to the 'situation' of the 
writing, it is in this threefold interaction of situation, author function, and 
reader function that meaning is accomplished. 
LANGUAGE 
We may now examine more closely the contending claims in the struggle 
for the dominance of meaning. The first of these is language, which is 
commonly held to embody or contain meaning either by direct 
representation or, in a more subtle way, by determining the perception of 
the world. Constitutive Graphonomy raises the question of language to 
prominence because language that exists in complexity, hybridity and 
constant change inevitably rejects the assumption of a linguistic structure or 
code which can be characterised by the colonial distinction of'standard' and 
'variant'. All language is 'marginal'; all language emerges out of conflict and 
struggle. The post-colonial text brings language and meaning to a discursive 
site in which they are mutually constituted, and at this site the importance 
of usage is inescapable. 
Although the view is rarely expressed by anyone conversant with 
languages in different cultures that language 'represents' or 'reflects' an 
autonomous reality, it is probably the most ubiquitous Western assumption 
about the operation of language because our sense of how words mean 
operates within a discourse in which the world (the object) is irremediably 
separated from the speaker (the subject). The Lockian separation of subject 
and object, the separation of the consciousness from the world of which it is 
conscious, is the schema which still underlies the modern Western episteme 
with its passion for 'scientific' objectivity and its tendency to see the world as 
a continuum of technological data. Such a view is possibly the most crucial 
factor separating Western society from those societies in which much 
(though not all) post-colonial literature is generated. The view of language 
which this schema installs is best represented by the theories of 'reference' 
which dominated Anglo-empiricism in the earlier part of this century, but 
which still hold sway in most empirical philosophies. According to this view 
words have referents in the real world, and what a word refers to is, for all 
intents and purposes, what it means. 
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But words are never so simply referential in the actual dynamic habits of 
a speaking community. Even the most simple words like 'hot', 'big', 'man', 
'got', 'ball', and 'bat', have a number of meanings, depending on how they 
are used. Indeed, these uses are the ways (and therefore what) the word 
means in certain circumstances. A word such as 'bat' can operate as a noun 
with several referents or as a verb describing several kinds of action. Many 
other words, such as 'bush' (which has found hundreds of uses in 
post-colonial societies), reveal that the meaning of words is also inextricably 
tied to the discourse of place. Post-colonial literature has continually shown 
both the importance of this discourse and the inescapable linking of meaning 
to the usage within the event. In his novel The Voice Gabriel Okara 
demonstrates the almost limitless prolixity of the words 'inside' and 'insides' 
to describe the whole range of human volition, experience, emotion and 
thought.^ Brought to the site of meaning which stands at the intersection 
between two separate cultures, the word demonstrates the total dependence 
of that meaning upon its 'situated-ness'. 
Language cannot, therefore, be said to perform its hermeneutic function 
by reflecting or referring to the world in a purely contingent way, and thus 
meanings cannot remain exclusively accessible to those speakers who 
'experience their referents', so to speak. The central feature of the ways in 
which words mean things in spoken or written discourse is the situation of 
the word. In general, one may see how the word is meant by the way it 
functions in the sentence, but the meaning of a word may require 
considerably more than a sentence for it to be adequately situated. The 
question remains whether it is the responsibility of the author in the 
cross-cultural text to employ techniques which more promptly 'situate' the 
word or phrase for the reader. While post-colonial writing has led to a 
profusion of technical innovation which exists to span the purported gap 
between writer and prospective reader, the process of reading itself is a 
continual process of contextualisation and adjustment directly linked to the 
constitutive relations within the discursive event. 
An alternative, determinist view which proposes that language actually 
constructs that which is perceived and experienced by speakers is less 
problematic for post-colonial literature. Edward Sapir proposed the exciting 
and revolutionary view that what we call the 'real' world is built up by the 
language habits of a group, and that the worlds in which different societies 
live are quite distinct, not merely the same world with different labels 
attached.® The central idea of Whorf and Sapir's thesis is well known. It 
proposes that language functions not simply as a device for reporting 
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experience, but also, and more significantly, as a way of defining experience 
of its speakers: 
... the linguistic system (in other words, the grammar) of each language is not merely 
a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas but rather is itself the shaper of ideas, the 
program and guide for the individual's mental activity, for his analysis of impressions, 
for his synthesis of his mental stock in trade ... We dissect nature along the line laid 
down for us by our native languages. The categories and types that we isolate from 
the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in 
the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions 
which has to be organised in our minds - and this means by the linguistic system in 
our minds. ^ ® 
But even this more attractive view of the link between language and the 
world may give rise to a number of objections f rom constitutive theory. 
Clearly, language offers one set of categories and not ano ther for speakers 
to organise and describe experience, but to assume that language creates 
meanings in the minds of speakers misconceives the way in which meaning 
is constituted in discourse. While it is quite clear that language is more than 
a ' reproducing inst rument for voicing ideas' (for what do thoughts or ideas 
look like apart f rom their expression in language?), the same objections can 
be applied to the idea of language as the 'shaper ' or ' p rog rammer ' of ideas. 
Such ideas are still inaccessible apart from language. T o possess a language 
is to possess a technique, not necessarily a quan tum of knowledge about the 
world; and therefore it is tautological to say that one speaker 'sees' the world 
in the same way as another because they share a technique for putting 
certain rules into practice - the 'seeing' is embedded in the practice. To speak 
of language as 'shaping' ideas also logically leads to the identification of one 
particular 'shaping' with a particular language, or more commonly, with the 
use of language in a particular place. This sort of identification leaves itself 
no conceptual room to cope with the phenomenon of second language use 
or vernacular linguistic variance, for it is only in the most metaphorical sense 
that we can talk about a speaker 'seeing' a different world when s/he speaks 
in a second language. 
But it is the situation of discourse ra ther than the linguistic system in the 
speaker's mind in which the 'obligatory terms' of language are structured. 
For instance, Whorf s discovery that Inuit languages have a variety of words 
for 'snow', thus suggesting they see the world differently f rom non-Inuits, 
overlooks the fact that skiers of all languages have a similar variety of words 
for snow, but could hardly be said to see the world differently in the way 
Whorf means. T h e meaning and na ture of perceived reality are not 
determined within the minds of the users, nor even within the language 
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itself, but within the use, within the multiplicity of relationships which 
operate in the system. Margaret Atwood makes an interesting reference to 
a North American Indian language which has no noun-forms, only verb-
forms. In such a linguistic culture the experience of the world remains in 
continual process. Such a language cannot exist if language is either anterior 
or posterior to the world but reinforces the notion that language inhabits 
the world, in practice. The semantic component of the sentence is contained 
in the syntax: the meaning of a word or phrase is its use in the language, a 
use which has nothing to do with the kind of world a user 'has in his or her 
head'. 
What the speaker 'has in mind', like a linguistic system or culture, or 
intentions or meanings, is only accessible in the 'retrospective' performance 
of speaking. The categories which language offers to describe the world are 
easily mistaken to shape something in the mind because we naturally assume 
that, like the rules of chess, we hold the linguistic system 'in our minds', in 
advance of the world. But language is co-extensive with social reality, not 
because it causes a certain perception of the world, but because it is 
inextricable from that perception. 
Languages exist, therefore, neither before the fact nor after the fact but 
in the fact. Languages constitute reality in an obvious way: they provide some 
terms and not others with which to talk about the world. Because they 
provide a limited lexicon they may also be said (metaphorically) to 'use' the 
speaker, rather than vice versa. But the worlds constituted in this way do 
not become fixed composites in the speaker's mind, a set of images which 
differs, by definition, from the set in the mind of the speaker of a different 
language. Worlds exist by means of languages, their horizons extending as 
far as the processes of neologism, innovation, tropes and imagination will 
allow the horizons of the language itself to be extended. 
THE READER FUNCTION IN THE WRITING 
If the written text is a social situation, the post-colonial text emphasises the 
central problem of this situation, the 'absence' of those 'functions' in the text 
which operate to constitute the discursive event as communication: the 
'writer' and 'reader'. The author function, with its vision and intentions, its 
'gifted creative insight', has historically exerted the strongest claim upon the 
meaning of writing. But the concept of the author is quite alien to many 
post-colonial cultures and, as Eoucault has pointed out, is really a quite 
recent phenomenon in European culture. The need to ground discourse in 
an originating subject was the reason to accord it the status of a possession, 
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Speeches and books were assigned real authors only when someone had to 
be made responsible for them as possessions and therefore subject to 
punishment, first for transgressing religious rules and later for transgressing 
or affirming the rules of property ownership.^ ^ To attain this social and legal 
status the meaning had to be a product attributable to a subject. 
Consequently, the immense and complex forces of which the text was a 
product could be conveniently located in an originating mind. 
This should assist us to find some balance in assessing the author's place 
in the 'production' of the text. We have made an important start by rejecting 
the notion that meaning is a mental act, a sort of picture which the author 
translates into words or vice versa. But how does the non-English speaker, 
for instance, mean anything in English? Firstly, the writer, like the language, 
is subject to the situation, in that s/he must say something meanahle. This does 
not mean s/he cannot alter the language, and use it neologistically and 
creatively; it does mean, however, that the writer becomes limited, as any 
speaker is limited, to a situation in which words have meaning. In literature 
the 'situation' refers to something of extremely wide range. It is, at its 
simplest, the place of the word within a meanable context, the grammar or 
rules which make the context meanable, but it is also a continuously 
unfolding horizon which ever more finely articulates the meaning. (From 
the reader's point of view it is important to realise that the 'situation' extends 
beyond the text.) Literature, and particularly narrative, has the capacity to 
domesticate even the most alien experience. It does not need to reproduce 
the experience to construct the meaning. Thus although there is no word 
in English which has the associations of mana (oneness with the world) in 
Polynesian or Tjukurrpa (the 'Dreaming') in Pintjantjatjara, there is no 
insurmountable conceptual difficulty in articulating their associations. 
One could go further than this to say that the author is subject not only 
to the situation of discourse but to the reader as well. The reader is present, 
as 2i function, in the writing of the text. Thus the relationship between these 
social forces and the text is the same as that between the linguistic system 
and the 'text' of a particular world view: neither causal nor representative, 
but co-extensive. The crucial assertion of Constitutive Graphonomy is that 
within the framework of these social antecedents, the writer and reader 
functions are as 'present' to each other in the acts of writing and reading as 
conversants are in conversation. The reader may be present in the writing 
at a conscious level, in the author's sense of an audience, of a purpose for 
writing, but it is not necessarily so specific. To detect the presence of the 
reader function in the writing let us first think clearly whether the act of 
writing can ever exclude the simultaneous act of reading. That moment of 
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as Sartre says, the others 'were already present in the heart of the word, 
hearers and speakers awaiting their turn'.^^ The requirement of meanability 
itself implicates the reader function. The space within which the writer meets 
the reading other is neither one culture nor another, neither one language 
nor another, but parole, the situation of discourse 
THE WRITER FUNCTION IN THE READING 
Just as the reader writes' the text because s/he takes it to mean something, 
and just as the reader function is present in the writing as the focus of its 
meanability, so the author is present in the reading. Again, this is firstly true 
at a conscious level, where the reader accepts the convention that the author 
is telling him or her something in the text. S/he responds to the text as 
'telling' him or her something because such ways of using language as this 
literary text represents come within the rules for the activity of'telling'. But 
one cannot 'tell' others anything that they do not incorporate or 'tell' 
themselves. The mind is active in knowing. Whether in a child learning a 
language or in a scientist 'observing' an 'objective' universe, knowing is 
conducted within the situation of horizons of expectations and other 
knowledge. In reading, a horizon of expectations is partly established by the 
unfolding text, while a relevant horizon of other knowledge (actually other 
texts) is established by exploration. 
The reader constructs the other dialogic pole of discourse because 
speaking is a social act. But the reader does not simply respond to the 
convention of the authoring other; s/he responds to the 'intentionality' of 
the work itself, quite apart from any imputation of an author. The work is 
a way of seeing and responding, a way of directing attention to that which 
is 'given to consciousness'. It is more accurate to say that the reader sees 
'according to' or 'with' the text rather than sees 'it'. This orientation to the 
intentionality of the text occurs whether there is an actual author or not.^^ 
We can deduce from this that the intentionality of the text can hcpvi for the 
direction of the author's consciousness. Thus interpretation is never 
univocal, but the reader is subject to the situation, to the rules of discourse, 
and to the directing other, as the author is subject to them. 
As with language, our natural assumption about understanding is that it 
must be a discrete experience, that when we 'understand' there must be 
characteristic experiences of understanding which have corresponding 
identifiable mental correlates. Otherwise how could we 'understand' a writer 
(even one writing in a common language) who has a profoundly different 
experience of the world? But we can test this assumption that understanding 
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identifiable mental correlates. Otherwise how could we 'understand' a writer 
(even one writing in a common language) who has a profoundly different 
experience of the world? But we can test this assumption that understanding 
is an identifiable experience. Take the example of a bricklayer who uses the 
term 'Brick!' as an elliptical form of the phrase 'Pass me a brick'. Neither 
the bricklayer nor the person to whom s/he is talking needs to translate the 
word 'Brick!' into the phrase every time it is used in order to understand it. 
The word operates perfectly well as a communication within the exchange 
and it is its use and the continuation of the job which locates the 
understanding of the word 'Brick' as an order. The same process applies 
when English variants, neologisms and borrowings are situated in the 
written English text. As with most words there may be many possible uses 
but it is the use in this situation which locates the meaning. Gabriel Okara's 
use of'inside' and 'insides' is an obvious case in point. 
The processes of understanding are therefore not limited to the minds of 
speakers of one mother tongue and denied the speakers of another. Meaning 
and the understanding of meaning exist outside the mind, within the 
engagement of speakers using the language. Understanding, then, is not a 
function of what goes on in the 'mind' at all, but a location of the hermeneutic 
object in its linguistic situation. When I understand a language, I can go on 
to continue the discourse. When I understand what other people say, I am 
not required to have their mental images; and when they communicate 
meaning they are not obliged to transfer to the listener the 'contents' of their 
mind, nor any of the mental images and associations which may be aroused 
by that language. 
THE METONYMIC FUNCTION OF POST-COLONIAL LANGUAGE 
Given the multiaccentuality of meaning which a Constitutive Graphonomy 
uncovers, the question remains as to how the post-colonial text itself resists 
the reincorporation of its discursive practice into an amorphous universal 
textuality. As I have suggested, it does this by actually installing alterity and 
absence in the interstices of the text. Whether written from monoglossic, 
diglossic or polyglossic cultures, such writing uses language to signify 
difference while employing a 'sameness' which allows it to be understood. 
Such difference is signified by language 'variance', the part of the wider 
cultural whole which appropriates the language of the centre while setting 
itself apart. 
One of the most interesting features of post-colonial literature is that kind 
of writing which is informed by the linguistic principles of a first language, 
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adopted literary form. And it is this intersection of language which many 
writers propose as the distinguishing feature of post-colonial literature. This 
use of language is something for which the writer usually takes as evidence 
(of both his or her ingenuity and ethnographic function) an insertion of the 
'truth' of culture into the text by a process of metaphoric embodiment. But 
quite simply, language variance is métonymie, a synechdocic index of cultural 
difference which affirms the distance of cultures at the very moment in which 
it proposes to bring them together. 
The use of english inserts itself into a political discourse in post-colonial 
writing, and the transcription of english variants of all kinds captures that 
moment between the culture affirmed on the one hand as 'indigenous', or 
'national', and that on the other as 'imperialist', colonialist, or 'metropolitan'. 
In the play The Cord by the Malaysian writer K.S. Maniam the english variant 
establishes itself in clear contradistinction to the 'standard' within the 
dialogue itself. 
MulMah: What are you saying? Speaking English? 
Ratnam: The language you still think is full of pride. The language that makes you 
a stiff white corpse Uke this! 
Muûûah: But you're nothing. I'm still the boss here. 
Ratnam: Everything happens naturally. Now the language is spoke like I can speak 
it... I can speak real life English now. 
Muihiah: You can do that all day to avoid work! 
Ratnam: You nothing but stick. You nothing but stink. Look all clean, inside all 
thing dirty. Outside everything. Inside nothing. Taking-making. 
Walking-talking. Why you insulting all time? Why you sit on me like 
monkey with wet backside? ̂ ^ 
There are two principles operating in this passage which are central to the 
writing of all cross-cultural literature. On the one hand there is a repetition 
of the general idea of the interdependence of language and identity - you 
are the way you speak. This general idea includes the more specific 
Malaysian and Singaporean debate about whether 'standard' English or local 
variants should be spoken in the region. The language of power, the 
language of the metropolitan centre is that of Muthiah, while the 'real life 
English', the language variant of cultural fidelity, is the one spoken by 
Ratnam. 
But the other, more distinctive act of the cross-cultural text is to inscribe 
difference and absence as a corollary of that identity. The articulation of two 
quite opposed possibilities of speaking and therefore of political and cultural 
identification outlines a cultural space between them which is left unfilled, 
and which, indeed, locates the core of the cross-cultural text. This unbridged 
and redolent gulf of silence remains the energising centre of post-colonial 
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writing. It is undiluted and perfect because it exists beyond language, the 
ultimate signifier of difference. This gap becomes itself the sign of a fracture 
between different worlds, worlds which may be sharable in language, but 
whose apartness - the difference of lifetimes of associations, traditions, 
simple experiences, learned responses and conventional allusions - is 
explicitly confirmed. In this way the integrity of the traditional 
interpretation of the world is articulated by difference and located firmly 
within its own 'world' of experience. 
But the location of this aphasie cultural gulf in the text is made most often 
and most strikingly by uses of language which we could call the 'devices of 
otherness', the devices which appear specifically utilised to establish the 
difference and uniqueness of the post-colonial text. Apart from direct 
glossing in the text, either by explanation or parenthetic insertions, such 
devices include syntactic fusion, in which the english prose is structured 
according to the syntactic principles of a first language; neologisms (new 
lexical forms in English which are informed by the semantic and 
morphological exigencies of a mother tongue); the direct inclusion of 
untranslated lexical items in the text; ethno-rhythmic prose which 
constructs an english discourse according to the rhythm and texture of a 
first language; and the transcription of dialect and language variants of many 
different kinds, whether they come from diglossic, polydialectical or 
monolingual communities. 
At its extreme, as in the insertion of unglossed foreign language in the 
text, such language use is a direct confrontation with the requirement of 
meanability. Signifiers of alterity are not necessarily inaccessible; rather they 
explicitly establish a distance between the writer and reader functions in the 
text as a cultural gap. The gap of silence reaffirms the parameters of 
meanability as cultural parameters, and the language use offers its own 
hybridity as the sign of an absence which cannot be simply traversed by an 
interpretation. It directly intercepts notions of 'infinite transmissability' to 
protect its difference from the incorporating universalism of the centre. 
In conclusion we can say that post-colonial theory offers a particular 
insight into questions of literary ontology and hermeneutics. The post-
colonial writing, by stressing the distance between the participants, 
re-emphasises the constitutive nature of the meaning event and the complex 
nature of the usage in which meaning is accomplished. But the most 
interesting possibilities of this theory are provided by the way in which it 
distances itself from the tendency of European theory to establish universal 
laws and principles. Post-colonial writing questions assumptions about 
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distances itself from the tendency of European tiieory to establish universal 
laws and principles. Post-colonial writing questions assumptions about 
meaning and its transmissability, and privileges the conception of writing as 
a social act conceived within the fusion of culture and consciousness. 
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